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 PAUL D. SCHUMAKER
 P OLMCAL SCIENTISTS have long been concerned with electoral
 activity and formal interest-group activity as methods of citizen
 participation linking public policy preferences to governmental out-
 puts.' However, as a means of assuring that public policy cor-
 responds to citizen preferences, both of these modes of participa-
 tion have their limitations. For example, Verba and Nie argue
 that "voting can provide a lot of pressure on leaders (especially if
 * This article is a revised version of a paper entitled "Urban Protest Groups:
 Explaining Successful Interactions with Public Authorities," presented at the
 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Denver, Colo.,
 April 4-6, 1974. I am grateful to Peter Eisinger, Charles Cnudde, Jean Schu-
 maker, Russell Getter, Herman Lujan, and David Jones for their many helpful
 suggestions and their assistance in developing, researching, or reporting the
 concepts in this paper.
 1 The literature on the policy effectiveness of electoral and interest-group
 participation is enormous. See Norman R. Luttbeg, ed., Public Opinion and
 Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage (rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey
 Press, 1974), for many of the important recent articles in this area. Two major
 studies on these issues at the community level have appeared in recent years.
 See Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democ-
 racy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); and Heinz
 Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptions, Linkages,
 Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-
 Merrill Company, 1973).
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 they wish re-election) but it conveys little information per se on
 the preferences of the participants."2 Participation through interest
 groups is a superior linkage mechanism in that it conveys much
 more specific information about citizen attitudes, but it has the
 deficiency that primarily well-educated, high-income citizens par-
 ticipate in interest groups. The result, as E. E. Schattschneider
 succinctly put it, is that "the heavenly chorus [of the interest-
 group system] sings with a strong upper class accent."3
 Given these limitations of both voting and formal interest-group
 activity, political scientists might profitably explore additional
 modes of participation and examine their adequacy as linkage
 mechanisms. In this respect, research by Gabriel Almond and
 Sidney Verba has shown that most citizens believe that their pri-
 mary interests can best be communicated to political officials
 through informal issue-specific groups rather than through electoral
 activity or formal interest-group participation. According to Al-
 mond and Verba, when wishing to influence government, "respon-
 dents less frequently mention enlisting the support of formal groups
 than informal groups-arousing their neighbors, getting friends and
 acquaintances to support their position, circulating a petition."'
 And particularly in the United States and Britain, "the use of in-
 formal groups is seen . . . as the key to effective protest."5 How-
 ever, as a limitation on the importance of such groups, they note
 that "the use of informal groups as a means of influencing a gov-
 ernment decision is considered much more appropriate at the local
 than on the national level."6
 One of the tasks which Robert Dahl attempts to accomplish in
 Who Governs? is to demonstrate that this subjective belief in the
 effectiveness of informal group activity at the local level is well
 founded. To illustrate this point, Dahl describes the case of the
 metal houses where Miss Mary Grava and her neighbors in New
 Haven organized on an informal basis, protested, and attained the
 desired policy response from the New Haven political system.7
 2 Participation in America, 322.
 3 The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
 1960), 35.
 4 The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), 150.
 5 Ibid., 157.
 6 Ibid.
 7Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), 191-
 200.
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 Thus, citizens may frequently use informal group activity to con-
 vey their interests and demands to community authorities, and
 authorities may frequently be responsive. However, such informal
 group activity has received little systematic attention from political
 scientists. The reason for this inattention seems to be that informal
 group activity of the type described by Almond, Verba, and Dahl
 is clearly protest activity, but the concept of "protest" has in recent
 years acquired an overly restrictive meaning. For example, Michael
 Lipsky has argued that protest activity is "a mode of political action
 oriented toward objection of one or more policies or conditions,
 characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional
 nature."8 Peter Eisinger writes that protest "is a device by which
 groups of people manipulate fear of disorder and violence while
 at the same time they protect themselves from paying the potenti-
 ally extreme costs of acknowledging such a strategy."9 These
 definitions equate protest activity with direct action tactics; the term
 "protest group" is reserved for those who use demonstrations, ob-
 structions, boycotts, and other "unconventional" participation strate-
 gies. By focusing on groups employing such strategies, students of
 protest groups have ignored the more frequent activities of other-
 wise unorganized citizens who coalesce on an informal basis to
 influence public authorities through conventional strategies.
 In order to correct the deficiency of focusing on the unconven-
 tional, the following definition of protest groups is offered. Protest
 groups are groups of citizens who do not normally interact with
 governmental officials, but who, under certain conditions (when
 they perceive that their interests are threatened by the activities
 of others or that the political system can be of use in furthering
 these interests) organize on an informal, issue-specific basis to make
 demands on public officials through pressure processes.
 According to this definition, protest groups are not to be distin-
 guished from groups employing conventional political strategies, for
 they can use either conventional or unconventional strategies. In-
 stead, they are to be distinguished from traditional interest groups
 on grounds of regular access to authorities.'0 Those groups whose
 8 Protest in City Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), 2.
 9 "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," American Political
 Science Review, 67 (March 1973), 14.
 10 See Schattschneider, Semisovereign People, 28-29, for a justification of this
 distinction.
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 leaders have a high degree of continuous interaction with public
 officials are here labeled "interest groups." Those groups which
 do not continually interact with public officials but do so on an
 issue-specific basis are here labeled "protest groups." Normally
 those interest groups having regular access can be expected to have
 more abundant power resources (for example, professional leader-
 ship, financial well-being, legitimacy, and the like) than those
 protest groups lacking regular access. It is in this sense that pro-
 test groups are "relatively powerless.""
 Given this conception of protest groups, two questions immedi-
 ately suggest themselves about the effectiveness of protest-group
 activity in local politics: (1) Are local political systems normally
 responsive to protest-group demands and activities? and (2) Under
 what conditions are local political systems most responsive to pro-
 test-group demands and activities?
 Most political science research has been directed toward an-
 swering the first question. Pluralists have argued that citizens who
 organize themselves as informal protest groups can be effective;
 they have collected data which describe political systems as re-
 sponsive to protest-group demands.12 Elite theorists have con-
 tended that informal protest groups are seldom effective; they have
 collected data which describe political systems as unresponsive to
 protest-group demands.'3 Such studies appear to leave political
 science with little more than ideologically biased case studies.
 Transcending the elite theorist and pluralist perspectives, it can
 be suggested that political officials in local communities are some-
 times responsive, sometimes nonresponsive, and sometimes partially
 responsive to protest-group demands. A concern for theoretical
 explanation rather than simple description requires a search for
 11 Lipsky, in Protest in City Politics, 2, has characterized protest groups as
 being "relatively powerless." However, the finding that protesters have a
 higher socio-economic status than nonprotesters has led to a denial of this claim.
 For a discussion of these notions, see Peter K. Eisinger, "Racial Differences in
 Protest Participation," American Political Science Review, 68 (June 1974), 596-
 601.
 12 Dahl's Who Governs? is the effective treatment of this viewpoint.
 13 See, for example, Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from
 the Bottom," Journal of Politics, 32 (August 1970), 501-530, and the essays in
 Race and Politics in New York City, ed. Jewell Bellush and Stephen M. David
 (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971).
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 those conditions or factors that result in communities being more
 or less responsive.
 Some scholars have sought to specify variables affecting the
 probability that protest groups will receive favorable or unfavorable
 responses from political systems.'4 Although helpful in many ways,
 their explanations have suffered several deficiencies. Some have
 been stated in very unsystematic and informal terms; explanatory
 variables are not drawn together and interrelated in a summary
 model. Thus such methodological possibilities as spuriousness and
 developmental sequences are ignored. Other explanations have
 considered a very limited set of explanatory variables; by ignoring
 the possible impact of variables suggested by other researchers,
 the development of cumulative evidence regarding the relative
 importance of various explanatory variables is retarded. In addi-
 tion, most explanations, being empirically grounded in a few case
 studies, have met only primitive standards of verification. Never-
 theless, the explanations offered by various analysts can be drawn
 together, stated systematically, and tested using a comparative data
 base. These are the objectives of this paper.
 A MODEL OF PROTEST-GROUP INFLUENCE
 The degree of responsiveness by local political systems to protest-
 14 The most important study in this regard is Lipsky's Protest in City Politics.
 However, other studies which seek to explain responsiveness include Bryan
 Downs and Kenneth Greene, "The Politics of Open Housing in Three Cities,"
 American Politics Quarterly, 1 (April 1973), 215-243; Donald Von Eschen,
 Jerome Kirk, and Maurice Pinard, "The Conditions of Direct Action in a
 Democratic Society," Western Political Quarterly, 22 (June 1969), 309-325;
 Cornelis J. Lammers, "Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organi-
 zation Conflicts Between Rulers and Ruled," Administrative Science Quarterly,
 4 (December 1969), 558-572; Robert Crain et al., The Politics of School De-
 segregation (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1969); James Q. Wilson,
 "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," Journal of Conflict
 Resolution, 5 (September 1961), 291-303; Richard Lovak, "Urban Renewal
 Controversies," Public Administration Review, 32 (July/August 1972), 359-
 373; and John H. Mollenkopf, "On the Causes and Consequences of Neighbor-
 hood Mobilization" (paper presented at the 69th annual meeting of the Ameri-
 can Political Science Association, New Orleans, La., September 4-8, 1973).
 For a broad theoretical overview of the role of discontented groups in the
 political process, see William Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.:
 Dorsey Press, Inc., 1968).
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 group demands is the dependent variable in this study. The ex-
 planatory or independent variables are aspects of two constructs:
 (1) protester-controlled variables, and (2) the environment of social
 support. A schematic diagram showing the hypothesized linkages
 among these constructs as well as the types of variables used here
 is given in Figure 1.
 FIGURE 1
 PIROTESTEIR-CONTROLLED VARIABLES, SOCIAL SUPPORT, AND RESPONSIVENESS
 Protester-controlled Environment of Responsiveness
 Variables + Social Support
 Variables in this Study Variables Variable
 Demand Dimensions Degree of Support Policy Responsiveness
 Zero-Sumness or Hostility of the
 Status-Welfare following Sectors:
 Status quo/Change Agency Officials
 Leadership Dimensions Elected Officials
 Radicalness of Leaders The Media
 Presence of External Leaders Active Groups
 Organization Dimensions Community as
 Organizational Stability a Whole
 Number of Active Members
 Action Dimension
 Unconventionality of Actions
 Before discussing general hypotheses, it is useful to define the
 basic concepts in the model. Because the concept of responsiveness
 has been particularly troublesome, it will be dealt with first.15 In
 15 In other contexts, the term "responsiveness" has taken on a number of
 divergent meanings. For example, Verba and Nie, in Participation in America,
 299-304, define responsiveness as the degree to which community elites mirror
 the ideology, values, and attitudes of the inactive population. State policy
 analysts have conceptualized responsiveness as the degree to which public
 policy is congruent with public opinion. As an illustration, see Ronald Weber,
 Public Policy Preferences in the States (Bloomington: Institute for Public
 Administration, Indiana University, 1971). Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau
 define responsiveness in terms of the degree to which policy-makers look to
 their constituency for policy-making cues. See "Political Matrix and Political
 Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure for an Old Problem,"
 American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969), 427-441.
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 this study, responsiveness is conceptualized as the relationship be-
 tween the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest
 group and the corresponding actions of the political system which
 is the target of the protest-group demands. In order to complete
 this definition of responsiveness, criteria must be formulated speci-
 fying the types of actions local systems must take in order to be
 considered responsive. After all, different persons have different
 standards for measurinig the responsiveness of political systems.
 For example, some may suggest that giving a group a fair hearing
 constitutes responsive action.'6 However, others argue that only
 those systems can be termed responsive which actually alleviate the
 grievances of protest groups by bringing about real changes in
 their living conditions."7
 Five criteria of responsiveness can be suggested and the distinc-
 tiveness of each criterion illustrated by an example. Suppose that a
 protest group demands open housing legislation as a means of en-
 hancing opportunities for inner city blacks. In response, authorities
 may first be willing to meet with protest-group leaders to discuss
 the possibility of enacting such legislation. The notion of "access
 responsiveness" indicates the extent to which authorities are willing
 to hear the concerns of such a group.18 Of course, granting access
 fails to indicate that authorities will make a serious effort to con-
 sider the demands. However, if the demand for open housing is
 made into an issue and placed on the agenda of the political system,
 there has occurred a second type of responsiveness which can here
 be labeled "agenda responsiveness. "19 As the proposal for open
 housing which is on the agenda is passed into law, a third type
 of responsiveness is attained; the notion of "policy responsiveness"
 indicates the degree to which those in the political system adopt
 legislation or policy congruent with the manifest demands of pro-
 test groups. Still, the passage of open housing legislation does
 1I The notion that a "fair hearing" constitutes adequate responsiveness may
 frequently be embraced by protesters themselves. See Gamson, Power and
 Discontent, 51.
 17 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 130-162.
 18 This concept of access-responsiveness is similar to Eisinger's notion of
 "breeching the political opportunity structure." See "Conditions of Protest
 Behavior," 17.
 19 For a discussion of this idea, see Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder,
 Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building (Bos-
 ton: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972).
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 not ensure that such a policy will be effectively implemented;
 funds and personnel may not be allocated to enforce the legislation.
 But if measures are taken to ensure that the legislation is fully
 enforced, then a fourth type of responsiveness is attained; "output
 responsiveness" indicates the degree to which those in the political
 system implement policy-responsive actions. Yet, even fully im-
 plemented policies may not change the underlying condition which
 gave rise to the original demand. For a variety of reasons (for
 example, cultural considerations, financial considerations, and so
 on) very few blacks may take advantage of the open housing
 legislation by moving to predominantly white areas of the city.
 Only if the underlying grievance is alleviated would a fifth type of
 responsiveness be attained; "<impact responsiveness" indicates the
 degree to which the actions of the political system succeed in
 alleviating the grievances of protest groups.20
 In this paper only the intermediate standard of responsiveness,
 policy responsiveness, is examined.21 Because the adoption of re-
 sponsive policies in no way guarantees that the underlying griev-
 ances of the protest group will be alleviated, it would of course be
 preferable to deal with the more rigorous standards of responsive-
 ness. But to do so would create enormous problems of discovering
 and measuring the implementation and impact of policy responsive
 actions. Although estimating output responsiveness and impact
 responsiveness to protest-group demands may be feasible in case
 study research, the obstacles hindering the collection of these data
 make such a goal unattainable in a comparative study like this
 one.22
 The model in Figure 1 suggests that policy responsiveness is par-
 tially explained by protester-controlled variables and social support
 variables. Protester-controlled variables are defined as those fac-
 20 For a further discussion of the distinction between policy, output, and
 impact, see Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output, and Impact" in Policy
 Analysis in Political Science, ed. Sharkansky (Chicago: Markham Publishing
 Co., 1970), 61-79.
 21 Data on a less rigorous standard of responsiveness, access responsiveness,
 have been collected and analyzed, but because of space limitations are not
 reported here. These data are available in my "Urban Protest Groups: Ex-
 plaining Successful Interactions with Public Authorities" (paper presented at
 the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Denver, Colo.,
 April 4-6, 1974.)
 22 a discussion of measuring the gap between policy responsiveness and
 impact responsiveness, see Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 85-162.
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 tors which protest groups can directly manipulate or control. In
 other words, it is presumed that some freedom of choice concern-
 ing these variables is available to protest groups even though these
 choices are influenced by certain factors not considered in this
 analysis. It is this freedom of choice which enables protesters to
 manipulate their own behavior so as to enhance their effectiveness.
 In this respect, the previous literature has suggested that certain
 choices by protest groups regarding their demands, strategies, or-
 ganizations, and leadership can influence their effectiveness.23
 Therefore, the various aspects of these concepts listed in Figure 1
 will be examined to determine their effects on policy responsiveness.
 Social support, the second explanatory construct in Figure 1,
 refers to varying degrees of backing or antagonism that segments
 of the community afford protest groups and their demands. As
 aspects of this construct, five segments which may affect responsive-
 ness are considered: (1) agency officials, (2) elected officials, (3)
 the media, (4) active groups in the community, and (5) the -com-
 munity as a whole."24
 In addition to conceptualizing social support as an independent
 variable affecting responsiveness, it is theoretically important to
 regard it as an intervening variable in a developmental sequence, as
 diagramed in Figure 1. As an intervening variable, social support
 may help interpret the relationships between protester-controlled
 23 The speculative and qualitative literature which links responsiveness to
 the nature of protest-group demands, organization, leadership, and strategies is
 enormous. See Schattschneider's discussion of the "mobilization of bias"
 against certain types of demands in Semisovereign People, 62-77. See Von
 Eschen et al., "Conditions of Direct Action," 319, for a discussion of the re-
 lationship between organizational size and responsiveness; and Saul Alinsky,
 Reveille for Radicals (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1969), 76-
 131, for a discussion of the importance of organizational stability. However,
 Michael Lipsky and Margaret Levi present a different view of the utility of
 organizational stability in "Community Organization as a Political Resource,"
 in People and Politics in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, Calif.:
 Sage Publications, 1972). See Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leader-
 ship in the South (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 145-232,
 for a discussion of the effects of leadership on responsiveness, and Amitai
 Etzioni, Demonstration Democracy (New York: Gordon & Breach, 1970),
 and Wilson, "Strategy of Protest," for illustrative discussions of the impact of
 unconventional protest actions on responsiveness.
 24 They are not intended to be exhaustive. Other sectors, such as the "com-
 munity power structure," may be important.
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 variables and responsiveness. For example, suppose that political
 systems are less responsive to "militant" protest leadership than to
 "nonmilitant" protest leadership. The intervening social support
 variables may partially explain this relationship. Militant leader-
 ship is likely to incur the hostility of many key sectors of the politi-
 cal community, and this hostility may be the cause of unrespon-
 siveness. Conversely, nonmilitant leadership may be supported by
 these sectors, and this support may be the primary cause of re-
 sponsiveness.
 The important point about conceptualizing social support as an
 intervening variable is that it is not a "given" or a "constant" for
 protest groups but rather is a variable which is partially dependent
 on protesters themselves. Thus, protest groups may depend on
 social support for success, as suggested by many theorists, but ap-
 propriate behaviors by protest groups may enhance social support
 which, in turn, may enhance the responsiveness of political systems.
 Given this model, three hypotheses will be formulated and tested.
 The first is general in nature and concerns the relative explanatory
 power of protester-controlled variables and social support variables.
 The second and third are more specific and explore the effects of
 particular social support and protester-controlled variables on policy
 responsiveness.
 Hypothesis 1. Protester-controlled variables are less important
 than the environment of social support in explaining the policy
 responsiveness of local political systems to protest-group demands.
 This hypothesis is drawn from literatures regarding elite re-
 sponsiveness and protest-group power. Political elites appear to
 have role perceptions, attitudes, and values which make them
 relatively unresponsive to various protest-group demands and ac-
 tions but relatively attentive to the attitudes of certain sectors of
 the community. Many officials appear to have adopted "representa-
 tional response styles" making them immune to pressure from in-
 formal protest groups. Rather than responding to the pressures of
 "ad hoc issue groups," many city officials perceive their role as
 responding to "unattached individuals," to their own "self-defined
 image of community needs," or to "attentive publics."25 Verba and
 Nie note the great concurrence in the attitudes of public officials
 25 M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler, "Response Styles and Politics:
 The Case of School Boards," Midwest Joumnal of Political Science, 15 (May
 1971), 290-321; and Prewitt and Eulau, "Political Matrix," 430.
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 and the attentive or active public,26 and thereby suggest that offic-
 ials will not usually be responsive to protest groups unless active
 publics support the protest-group demands. Lowi argues that the
 symbiotic relationships between authorities and organized groups
 prevent the various actions of new groups from being purposively
 considered unless organized groups are supportive.27
 The literature on protest groups also implies that responsiveness
 may be determined more by social support than by protest-group
 behaviors. Protesters are often viewed as having few power re-
 sources of their own and thus must get others in the community to
 apply their resources on behalf of the protest group. Lipsky has
 written that protesters "depended for success not upon direct utili-
 zation of power, but upon activating other groups to enter the
 political arena."28 Murray Edelman succinctly summarizes this
 view by noting that what "lends power to a movement and provides
 a setting in which leadership can effectively operate [is] the distri-
 bution of social support."29
 Hypothesis 2. The support or opposition of long-standing active
 groups in a community is a particularly important factor influenc-
 ing the policy responsiveness of local political systems. However,
 the attitudes of agency officials, elected officials, the media, and
 the community as a whole are also significant factors affecting
 policy responsiveness.
 The primary importance of active groups in the determination of
 policy responsiveness is suggested by group theory. Both plural-
 ists and antipluralists have viewed policy in various issue areas as
 being determined by the "effective access" of various interest
 groups.30 In these views, policy is, in large part, the result of the
 interests and power of traditional pressure groups which dominate
 specific policy areas. Lipsky is the protest-group theorist who
 stresses the importance for protest groups of obtaining the support
 26 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, 304-333.
 27 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton &
 Company, 1969), 87-89.
 28 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 1.
 29Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971),
 24.
 30 For different views of the enormous influence which traditional interest
 groups have on public policy, contrast David Truman, The Governmental
 Process (2d ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 507, with Lowi, End of
 Liberalism, 55-97.
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 of active groups, particularly those groups who are the reference
 publics of protest targets. For, according to Lipsky, "the essence of
 political protest consists of activating third parties to participate in
 the controversy in ways favorable to protest groups.'
 Nevertheless, active groups may not be the only sector in the
 community whose attitudes are important determinants of policy
 responsiveness.32 The traditional group-theory notion that political
 authorities are neutral referees in the group struggle has been
 effectively challenged, and today there is much evidence that the
 attitudes of agency officials and elected officials greatly affect public
 policy.33 Thus it is hypothesized that the attitudes of these public
 officials will also affect policy responsiveness to protest-group de-
 mands.
 Norton E. Long has suggested another sector of the community
 which plays an important role in the determination of public
 policy: the mass media.
 A major protagonist of things in general in the territorial system is the news-
 paper. . . . In a sense, the newspaper is a prime mover in setting the territorial
 agenda. It has a great part in what most people will be talking about, what
 most people will think the facts are, and what most people will regard as the
 way problems should be dealt with.34
 Thus the support or opposition of the media to protest-group de-
 31 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 172.
 32 This criticism of Lipsky's over-emphasis on "third parties" has been made
 elsewhere. See Willis D. Hawley, review of Protest in City Politics by Michael
 Lipsky in the American Political Science Review, 64 (December 1970), 1,257.
 Peter Eisinger, in "Conditions of Protest Behavior," 15-16, has also noted that
 protest groups need not depend upon active groups.
 33 The importance of the attitudes of public officials in urban policy-making
 is attested to by Gamson, Power and Discontent, 28-31; Heinz Eulau and
 Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," Ameri-
 can Political Science Review, 62 (March 1968), 124-143; and Robert L. Crain,
 Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict
 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), 99-121. Yet, some researchers,
 such as Downs and Green, "Politics of Open Housing," continue to argue that
 the influence of elected officials is problematic. Lowi, End of Liberalism, 200-
 206, distinguishes between the power of agency officials and that of elected
 officials in affecting urban policy and argues that the former are very influential
 while the latter are quite powerless.
 34 Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games,"
 American Journal of Sociology, 64 (November 1958), 259-260.
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 mands is hypothesized to be another factor affecting policy re-
 sponsiveness.
 Finally the attitude of "the community as a whole," a concept
 similar to the notion of constituency as discussed by Miller and
 Stokes, may affect policy responsiveness.35 Even though it is diffi-
 cult to speak of a political community or constituency as a mono-
 lithic united whole, the notion of "community attitude" or "con-
 stituency attitude" as a reservoir of general salient community
 opinion appears to have a psychological existence in the minds of
 authorities. The perception of dominant community attitudes is
 sometimes an important determinant of public policy. It is here
 hypothesized to affect policy responsiveness.
 In summary, it is hypothesized that the attitudes of active groups
 are highly related to policy responsiveness. But it is also hypo-
 thesized that agency officials, elected officials, the media, and
 community as a whole play important roles in affecting the policy
 response of local polities to protest demands.
 Hypothesis 3. Policy responsiveness should be reduced when
 protest groups adopt militant behaviors. Groups whose demands,
 actions, and leadership can be characterized as nonmilitant should
 be more successful than groups whose demands, actions, and leader-
 ship can be characterized as militant.
 In the literature on protest-group politics, the notion of militancy
 has been much discussed, yet there has been little consensus as to
 the meaning of militancy or as to the effectiveness of militant
 citizen behaviors. Perhaps the most satisfying discussions of the
 concept have appeared in the Negro politics literature, particularly
 in the work of Wilson, Ladd, and Matthews and Prothro.36 This
 literature suggests that militancy is a multidimensional continuous
 variable indicated by protest-group characteristics concerning goals
 sought, means utilized, and the mannerisms of leadership. In par-
 ticular, militancy is present when goals are adopted that are highly
 threatening to others in the community, when actions are under-
 taken that are combative, aggressive, and have an implied threat of
 35Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Con-
 gress," American Political Science Review, 57 (March 1963), 45-56.
 365James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960),
 214-254; Ladd, Negro Political Leadership, 145-232; and Donald R. Matthews
 and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York:
 Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), 186-200.
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 violence, and when leadership adopts rhetoric seeking to polarize
 the community by picturing the conflict as one involving the forces
 of good and evil. At the other end of the nonmilitancy/militancy
 continuum, nonmilitancy-variously labeled moderation, conserva-
 tism, and traditionalism in the Negro politics literature-is indi-
 cated by the adoption of goals which are not threatening to others
 in the community, by employing conventional political actions like
 litigation and negotiation, and by choosing leadership which speaks
 a language of amelioration and consensus-building.
 In order to examine the effectiveness of militant behaviors, a
 number of dimensions of protest-group demands, leadership, and
 actions can be conceptualized which, on the basis of the previous
 literature and common sense, take values capable of being charac-
 terized as nonmilitant or militant.3 These variables and the values
 they take along a nonmilitant/militant continuum are summarized
 in Figure 2.38
 The three demand variables in this analysis are the zero-sumness
 of demands, the status-welfare dimension of demands, and the
 status quo/change dimension of demands. The zero-sumness di-
 mension is a theoretical concept concerned with the varying degrees
 in which protest-group demands imply either subjective or objective
 burdens for other groups in the community. At the operational
 level, some demands (for example, a demand for a stop light)
 normally approach the nonzero-sum end of the zero-sumness of
 demands continuum because they are not very threatening to
 others.39 Other demands (for example, for two-way busing of
 school children) are perceived as falling much closer to the zero-
 sum end of this continuum. Because the concept of militancy has
 been defined in terms of pursuing goals that are highly threatening
 37 Organizational variables, which constitute the fourth dimension of the
 protester-controlled variables in Figure 1, are not considered in relation to
 this hypothesis because it is difficult to characterize organizational stability and
 size in terms of militant or nonmilitant behavior. However, the relationship
 of these variables to responsiveness is of sufficient theoretical importance to
 warrant considerable separate attention.
 38For a somewhat similar chart, see Matthews and Prothro, Negroes and
 the New Southern Politics, 196.
 39 Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism," 512-513, describes just such a
 case. Political officials in Newark refused a request by inner city blacks for a
 stop light even though such a request seemed to imply few burdens for anyone.
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 Figure 2
 CHARACTERIZING DEMANDS, LEADERSHIP, AND ACTIONS ON A
 NONMILITANT/MILITANT CONTINUUM
 Protester-control- Nonmilitant Intermediate Militant
 led Variables Behavior Behavior Behavior
 Zero-sumness Demands Demands Pose Demands Pose
 Aspect of De- Threaten No Minor Threat Major Threat
 mands Other Groups to Others to Others
 Status-welfare Demands for Seek Rights Demands for
 Aspects of Material Benefits Linked to Mat- Rights
 Demands erial Benefits
 Status quo/ Demands to Demands for Demands for
 Change Aspect Uphold the Policy Changes Regime Changes
 of Demands Status Quo
 Ideology of Projects a Con- Projects a Mod- Projects a
 Leadership servative Style erate Style Radical Style
 Externalness of All Leaders Are Outsiders Outsiders Dom-
 Leadership Indigenous Participate inate Protest
 in Protest
 Unconventional- Negotiate with Use Nonviolent Use Violence
 ity of Protest Public Officials Direct Action
 Actions
 to others, the more zero-sum are protest-group demands, the more
 militant is the protest group.
 The status-welfare dimension of demands is a theoretical con-
 cept concerned with the varying degrees to which protest groups
 seek equal rights (status) and/or specific and concrete services
 (welfare). According to James Q. Wilson, demands which are
 predominantly status-oriented can be characterized as militant, and
 demands which are predominantly welfare-oriented can be charac-
 terized as nonmilitant.
 The moderate, in contrast to the militant, tends to seek welfare rather than
 status ends. . . . In those areas of civic life where moderates contribute their
 energies, they are more likely to choose the welfare aspects of issues, where
 such a choice is necessary, and they are the leaders responsible for those state-
 ments endorsing better schools, more public housing, a branch hospital, more
 Negro representation, and more private housing in preference to the more
 remote status ends.40
 40 Wilson, Negro Politics, 235.
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 The status quo/change dimension of demands is concerned with
 the degree to which demands are change-oriented. Lipsky, who
 calls goal defensiveness and goal assertiveness the polar variations
 on this continuum, writes that "goal defensiveness or assertiveness
 refers to whether protest activity is directed toward maintaining
 or securing some previously held value or whether it is directed
 toward promoting some new value. "41 Following conventional
 usage, demands for change can be characterized as radical or mili-
 tant behavior, and demands to uphold the status quo can be de-
 scribed as nonmilitant behavior.
 Two dimensions of leadership have values that can be charac-
 terized on a militancy continuum. The first is its projected ideol-
 ogy. Protest leaders adopt various "styles," vocabularies, rhetoric,
 and the like which result in their being perceived as conservative,
 moderate, liberal, or radical, the conservative styles implying non-
 militancy whereas the radical styles indicate militancy.42 The sec-
 ond dimension of leadership is the extent to which it is drawn
 from outside of the community (its "externalness"). Because the
 term "outsider" has so frequently been linked with the term "agi-
 tator" in the minds of community targets, the use of external leaders
 is here characterized as militant behavior.
 A dimension of protest-group actions may also take values that
 can be characterized on a militancy continuum. This dimension
 measures the extent to which protest-group actions are predomi-
 nantly conventional (for example, negotiating with public offic-
 ials, attending public hearings, circulating petitions, and so on)
 or unconventional (ranging from holding rallies and demonstra-
 tions through using violence). Again, following Wilson, uncon-
 ventional actions are characterized as militant behaviors.43
 The hypothesis that nonmilitant demands, leadership, and actions
 enhance policy responsiveness is based on the previous hypothesis
 that policy responsiveness should be greatly affected by the distri-
 bution of social support. The earlier literature suggests that mili-
 tant behaviors are not likely to be supported by many actors in
 the community. Indeed, Eisinger has recently written that "most
 41 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 196-197.
 42 For a discussion of leadership ideology and style, see Ladd, Negro Political
 Leadership, 145-232, and Wilson, Negro Politics, 214-254.
 43 Wilson, Negro Politics, 221-226 and 238-246.
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 surveys which have sought to tap attitudes toward [unconventional]
 protest have revealed predominantly hostile sentiments."44 These
 considerations suggest the hypothesis that a developmental se-
 quence occurs between protester-controlled variables and policy
 responsiveness whereby nonmilitant behaviors enhance social sup-
 port which, in turn, enhances the policy responsiveness of political
 systems.
 DATA SOURCES
 In order to test and elaborate on the above hypotheses, two
 samples of data regarding protest activity in American communi-
 ties have been collected: (1) protest incidents based on a content
 analysis of case studies; and (2) protest incidents based on in-
 formation attained from questionnaires. The decision to collect
 and analyze two different samples stemmed from the belief that
 each of the two data collection procedures had certain deficiencies
 which might result in biases.
 The Case Studies Sample
 Local protest incidents were selected for inclusion in this sample
 on the basis of the availability of written reports on the incident.
 If enough written material was available so that most of the theo-
 retical concepts could be measured, then the incident was included
 in the sample.45 Over 125 incidents were coded, but a number
 were omitted from the final analysis because data were insufficient.
 The final size for the case study sample was 93.
 Data on these 93 incidents were collected fr'bm the following
 sources: published scholarly and journalistic case studies, unpub-
 lished dissertations, the New York Times, and local newspapers.
 Generally, the procedure was to examine the case studies first and
 attain information on as many variables as possible. Then the
 44"Racial Differences in Protest Participation," 593.
 45 For other illustrations of this data collection technique in community re-
 search, see John Walton, "A Systematic Survey of Community Power Re-
 search," in The Structure of Community Power, ed. Michael Aiken and Paul
 Mott (New York: Random House, 1970), 443-464; and Claire W. Gilbert,
 Community Power Structure: Propositional Inventory, Tests, and Theory
 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), 1-6.
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 New York Times was examined for articles on the incident to ob-
 tain information on those variables for which data were missing
 in the case studies and to check the accuracy of the initial case
 study. Finally, if data were still missing on key variables, the local
 newspaper accounts were read. When the various data sources
 were not in agreement about certain factual matters, the New York
 Times was considered to be the most reliable data source, and the
 variables were coded on the basis of its accounts.
 From the descriptive and qualitative accounts of the protest
 incidents in these data sources, scaled measures of the theoretical
 concepts were obtained. This transformation of essentially qualita-
 tive data into quantitative data was accomplished by conceptualiz-
 ing each of the theoretical variables as having an underlying unide-
 mensional continuum which could be approximated by a five-point
 ordinal scale. To facilitate scaling, coders were instructed to con-
 sider all of the available qualitative data for each incident, to derive
 impressions of the relative value of each variable for each incident,
 and to measure their impressions by using a five-point ordinal scale.
 In addition, specific guidelines and examples were provided to
 assist coder judgment. For example, the scale used in measuring
 policy responsiveness and the guidelines for scaling this variable
 were as follows:
 (1) Repressive policy responses. Responding by taking no ac-
 tions favorable to protest groups and, instead, taking some actions
 which are unfavorable or repressive to them.
 (2) No action. The failure to take any action of either a re-
 pressive or responsive nature.
 (3) Minimal policy responses. Responding by taking such ac-
 tions as (a) establishing a program or law which is concerned with
 alleviating the protest grievances but which does not satisfy the
 protest group; (b) making token gestures; or (c) passing symbolic
 legislation.
 (4) Compromise policy responses. Responding by giving pro-
 test groups some, but not all, of what they demand.
 (5) Responsive policy actions. Responding by enacting policies
 congruent with the demands of protest groups.
 Because of the subjectivity involved in attaining quantitative mea-
 sures from the qualitative accounts in the case studies, two research-
 ers made independent measurements of the key theoretical vari-
 ables. Analysis suggested that the measures were quite reliable
 (the correlation coefficients between the measures of the two
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 observers were .80 or better for all but two variables )46 and that
 the measurement errors were of a random rather than systematic
 variety.
 The Questionnaire Sample
 In order to complement the case studies sample, a second sample
 of local protest incidents was collected by mailing questionnaires
 to 300 officials in 46 cities. These questionnaires were sent to offi-
 cials in agencies which are among the chief providers of contro-
 versial municipal services: (1) occupants of city hall (managers
 and mayors); (2) school administrators; (3) directors of welfare
 departments; (4) directors of health departments; (5) directors of
 pollution and environmental control agencies; (6) directors of hous-
 ing agencies; and (7) local model cities and urban renewal ad-
 ministrators. These officials returned 201 questionnaires, 119 of
 which were deemed usable.47
 The respondents to the questionnaire acted as informants provid-
 ing data-elicited through a combination of forced-response and
 open-ended questions-regarding the most recent protest incident
 targeted at their agency. For the variables measured by forced-
 response questions, the perceptions of the informants were used as
 indicators of the theoretical concepts. For those variables mea-
 sured by open-ended questions, the measurement procedures were
 similar to those used in the case studies sample. Because these
 measurements again involved coder subjectivity, two researchers
 independently coded these variables. Again, analysis suggested
 that the measures were quite reliable and free of bias by the
 coders.48
 It must also be noted that some of the measures in the question-
 46 The two variables having low reliability were the degree to which protest-
 group demands are change-oriented (r=.61), and the degree to which protest-
 group demands were threatening to others (r= .78).
 47 The main sources of unusable questionnaires were (1) agencies indicating
 that they had not been the target of any protest-group demands and therefore
 failing to provide any data usable for testing the hypotheses developed in this
 study (N=54); and (2) agencies which retumed questionnaires having mis-
 sing data on crucial variables. In this respect, a number of informants could
 provide no data on responsiveness because the protest incident was still in
 progress ( N = 18 ).
 48 The only variable having a reliability coefficient of less than .80 in this
 sample was the zero-sumness dimension of demands (r=.72).
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 naire sample are less precise than those in the case studies sample.
 Although all variables were measured on five-point scales in the
 case studies sample, some independent variables were measured
 dichotomously or trichotomously in the questionnaire sample.49 Be-
 cause of these differences in the scaling of variables in the two
 samples, standardized regression coefficients and correlation co-
 efficients are reported so as to maximize comparability.50
 The data used in this study clearly have certain deficiencies.
 First, neither of the two samples is random. As suggested in Table
 1, the following types of protest incidents are over-represented in
 the case studies sample: those of civil rights groups; those occur-
 ring in the South and Northeast; those occurring in the 1960s; and
 protest where direct action tactics and/or violence was used. In
 the questionnaire sample, however, the following types of protest
 incidents were overrepresented: that of neighborhood groups; that
 occurring in the Midwest; protest occurring in the early 1970s;
 and that involving conventional strategies. In addition to the non-
 random aspects of our samples revealed in Table 1, it should also
 be noted that most of the incidents in the case studies sample were
 very conspicuous, often drawing national attention, while those
 in the questionnaire sample were less widely known and reported.
 In short, because neither sample is random, caution must be exer-
 cised in generalizing on the basis of the data. Nevertheless, the
 wide variety of protest incidents examined in the two samples
 cumulatively provides a much better basis for generalizing than
 do the numerous single-incident case studies which dominate the
 literature.
 In addition to sampling error, the data reported here have certain
 measurement errors. Beyond that due to coder subjectivity, the
 data may have some measurement error resulting from the bias of
 49 Because of the need to provide informants with a short, simple question-
 naire, less information was collected regarding protest incidents in the ques-
 tionnaire sample than was collected for incidents in the case studies sample.
 This difference resulted in the decision to code some variables less precisely in
 the questionnaire sample.
 50 Because our measures do not have the precision of interval level measures
 required by regression procedures, the decision to report standardized regres-
 sion coefficients may appear inappropriate. However, see Ted Robert Gurr,
 Politimetrics: An Introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics (Englewood
 Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), 62-63, for a discussion of the ad-
 vantage of using regression techniques on noninterval level data.
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 TABLE 1
 CASE STUDIES SAMPLE AND QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE
 DESCRIBED AND COMPARED
 Case Studies Sample Questionnaire Sample
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
 Size of City Where
 Incident Occurred"
 Below 50,000 16 17 7 7
 50,000-200,000 21 23 19 18
 200,000-500,000 16 17 28 26
 500,000-1,000,000 13 14 39 37
 Over 1,000,000 27 29 13 12
 Regiona
 Northeast 40 43 23 22
 Midwest 13 14 53 50
 West 7 7 22 21
 South 33 36 8 7
 Year When Incident Began
 Prior to 1960 4 4 0 0
 1960-64 52 56 0 0
 1965-69 36 39 2 2
 1970 and After 1 1 117 98
 Nature of Protest Group'
 Civil Rights Group 60 65 23 19
 Neighborhood Group 19 20 58 49
 Students 13 14 28 24
 Parents of Students 19 20 27 23
 Welfare Recipients 7 7 29 24
 Environmentalists 4 4 11 9
 Others 13 14 25 21
 Predominant Actions of
 Protest Group
 Conventional 21 23 61 53
 Unconventional 72 77 58 48
 Policy Response of Local
 Political System
 Repression 6 6 2 2
 No Response 26 28 36 30
 Minimal Response 26 28 20 17
 Compromise Response 19 20 39 33
 Adopt Policy Congruent
 with Protest Demands 16 17 22 18
 The questionnaire sample totals 106 rather than 119 because the cities of 13
 returned questionnaires could not be identified.
 b Because some protest groups could be characterized in several ways, the
 totals exceea 100 percent.
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 the original data sources. On the one hand, the scholars and
 journalists who provided data for the case studies sample appeared
 frequently to sympathize with the protest groups; these sympathies
 may have resulted in their underestimating policy responsiveness.
 On the other hand, the city officials who provided data for the
 questionnaire sample, because they tend to view protest incidents
 from another perspective, are likely to have overestimated their re-
 sponsiveness.
 In summary, the data used in this study are subject to some un-
 avoidable sampling and measurement errors. An effort has been
 made to minimize these biases and deficiencies by collecting two
 data sets whose limitations partially offset each other. Neverthe-
 less, the results of the data analysis must be considered exploratory.
 EXPLANATIONS OF RESPONSIVENESS: RESULTS OF SOME TESTS
 We come now to testing and discussing the three hypotheses de-
 veloped earlier.
 Hypothesis 1. The hypothesis that protester-controlled variables
 are less important than the environment of social support in ex-
 plaining policy responsiveness is crucial to understanding the power
 of protest groups. To the extent that policy responses are affected
 by factors directly within the control of protest groups, it can be
 contended that protest groups have the ability to influence re-
 sponsiveness through the adoption of effective behaviors. The data
 in Tables 2 and 3 examine the combined and independent effects
 of protester-controlled variables and social support variables on
 policy responsiveness.
 Because the data in Table 2 indicate that less than 20 percent
 of the variance in policy responsiveness is accounted for by the
 eight protester-controlled variables listed in Figure 1 and because
 about 30 percent of the variance in policy responsiveness is ac-
 counted for by the five social support variables also listed in Figure
 1, the original hypothesis is supported by the data in both samples.
 Social support variables do appear to account for more of the
 variation in policy responsiveness than do factors within the direct
 control of protest groups.
 Another indication of the importance of protester-controlled
 variables relative to social support variables in affecting policy
 responsiveness can be gleaned from Table 3, which reports the
 zero-order correlations (r0), the partial correlations (rp), and the
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 TABLE 2
 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY RESPONSIVENESS BY VARIABLE CATEGORY
 Case Studies Sample Questionnaire Sample
 Multiple- Multiple
 Multiple partial Multiple- partial
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
 R R2 R R2 R R2 R R2
 Protester-
 controlled
 Variables .42 .18 .30 .09 .44 .19 .31 .10
 Social
 Support




 Support Variables .64 .40 .59 .35
 partial standardized regression coefficients (/'s) relating each in-
 dependent variable with policy responsiveness.5' Of the 14 beta-
 weights (/'s) relating protester-controlled variables to policy re-
 sponsiveness, only six (43 percent) are significant at the .05 level;
 but of the ten beta-weights relating social support variables to
 policy responsiveness, eight (80 percent) are significant at the .05
 level. In short, the data in Table 3 support the hypothesis that the
 various dimensions of social support are more strongly related to
 policy responsiveness than are the various protester-controlled
 variables.52
 The weak relationships between protester-controlled variables
 51 The beta-weights and partial correlation coefficients in Table 3 indicate
 the relationship between the various independent variables and responsiveness,
 controlling for all other variables within the construct. Thus, in examining a
 particular protester-controlled variable, other protester-controlled variables are
 controlled but social support is not controlled. Likewise, in examining a par-
 ticular support sector, other support variables are controlled whereas protester-
 controlled variables are not controlled.
 52 Nevertheless, protest groups are not totally dependent on social support.
 The stochastic nature of the relationship between obtaining support and ob-
 taining favorable responses is obvious. Indeed, when examining the relation-
 ships between social support and policy responsiveness in Tables 2 and 3, the
 surprising result is that the relationships are not stronger than is shown. Pro-
 test groups having the support of key sectors of the community sometimes fail
 to gain policies responsive to their demands, and groups lacking support seem
 to have had some successes.
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 TABLE 3
 DETERMINANTS OF POLICY RESPONSIVENESS BY SPECIFIC VARIABLES
 Case Studies Sample Questionnaire Sample
 rO 8 rp r0 / rp
 Protester-controlled Variables
 Demand Dimensions
 Status-Welfare .33 .290 .22 .20 .05 .06
 Zero-Sumness -.30 -.21 * -.16 -.36 -.31* -.31
 Status Quo/Change -.01 .20* .18 -.09 .10 .03
 Organizational Dimensions
 Number of Active Participants .05 .11 .11 .00 .09 .05
 Organizational Stability -.06 -.14* -.14 .01 .01 -.03
 Leadership Dimensions
 Externalness of Leadership" -.05 .00 .00
 Radicalness of Leadershipb -.22 -.14* -.14
 Actions
 Unconventionality of
 Protest-Group Actions -.02 -.04 -.03 -.26 -.17 -.12
 Environment of Social Support
 Agency Officials Support .20 .18* .21 .46 .35* .29
 Elected Officials Support .32 .20* .20 .37 .23* .21
 Media Support .15 -.24* -.23 .16 -.12 -.08
 Active Group Support .45 .34* .32 .32 .21* .16
 Community Support .44 .27* .27 .28 -.o5 .oo
 a Throughout this paper, an asterisk indicates statistical significance at the .05
 level. Because no claim is being made that the samples are random, the use of
 significance tests is not really appropriate. Significance is indicated only to
 help the reader determine the importance of the relationships.
 bThe variable "extemalness of leadership" was coded in the case studies
 only; the variable "radicalness of leadership" was coded in the questionnaire
 sample only.
 and policy responsiveness suggest the limited nature of opportuni-
 ties available for protest groups to manipulate the determinants of
 policy responsiveness to their own advantage. However, the tenta-
 tive nature of this assertion must be stressed. First, the relatively
 weak relationships between protester-controlled variables may be,
 in part, a function of measurement error.53 Secondly, it must be
 remembered that not all, and perhaps very few, protester-controlled
 53Random measurement error will result in underestimates of the "true"
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 variables have been considered and measured. As other variables
 controllable by protest groups are measured and brought into the
 model, the ability of protester-controlled variables to explain policy
 responsiveness might be appreciably enhanced. Thirdly, the asser-
 tion that protester-controlled variables are weakly related to policy
 responsiveness may be true as a broad generalization, but certain
 protester-controlled variables under specific conditions may be
 strongly related to responsiveness.54 Fourth, some protester-con-
 trolled variables in Table 3 are nevertheless generally related to
 policy responsiveness in indicative manners. Thus, although the re-
 lationships between protester-controlled variables and policy re-
 sponsiveness are quite weak, the conclusion should not be drawn
 that appropriate behaviors by protest groups cannot enhance policy
 responsiveness.
 Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis examines how policy re-
 sponsiveness is affected by the attitudes of five segments of the
 local polity: active groups, the community as a whole, agency
 officials, elected officials, and the media. The notion that active
 groups are particularly important in affecting the policy responsive-
 ness of communities to protest-group demands is supported by the
 data in Table 3. The direct effect of active group attitudes on
 responsiveness is suggested by the fact that ft = .34 in the case
 studies sample and , =.21 in the questionnaire sample. In both
 samples the relationship between active group support and policy
 responsiveness is significant and strong relative to the relationships
 between other support sectors and policy responsiveness. This
 relationship suggests that, when confronted with protest groups,
 community officials often look to active groups for cues and "re-
 spond in some way . . . [which] satisfies their reference publics."55
 The role of active groups in affecting policy responsiveness to
 protest-group demands can be compared to the role of the inactive
 public ("the community as a whole"). Consistent with the implica-
 strength of the relationships among our variables. See John Johnston, Eco-
 nometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), 148-176.
 54 In other words, there may be interaction effects whereby the weak general
 relationships reported here become strongly positive under some conditions and
 strongly negative under other conditions. See Hayward Alker, Jr., Mathematics
 and Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), 106-111, for a discus-
 sion of interaction effects.
 5 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 175.
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 tions of Lipsky and group theorists generally, the data indicate
 that policy responsiveness is apparently less influenced by the
 inactive public than by the active public. Although the support
 of the community as a whole is positively and significantly related
 to responsiveness in the case studies sample, no significant relation-
 ship exists in the questionnaire sample. This difference suggests
 that the community as a whole does not play the consistently im-
 portant role in affecting policy responses to protest-group demands
 that is played by active groups; instead, inactive publics may be
 important determinants of responsiveness only under specifiable
 conditions (for example, when protest is conspicuous or uncon-
 ventional) that are over-represented in the case studies sample.56
 The attitudes of political authorities, as well as the attitudes of
 active and inactive publics, may also affect policy responsiveness
 to protest-group demands. Yet, this possibility seems to be dis-
 counted by the leading protest-group theorist, Michael Lipsky.
 Lipsky writes that "in contrast to the simplistic pressure group
 model which would posit a direct relationship between pressure
 group and pressured, the following discussion is guided by the
 assumption (derived from observation) that protest is a highly in-
 direct process."57 As an indirect process, the "communications
 media and reference publics"-not the targets-play crucial roles
 in determining the response of local political systems. Lipsky,
 then, suggests that the attitudes of political authorities (agency
 officials and elected officials) are not highly influential. However,
 the data in Table 3 indicate that the attitudes of both agency
 officials and elected officials are important independent variables
 affecting policy responsiveness. In both samples, the attitudes of
 elected and agency officials are significantly related to policy re-
 sponsiveness. The attitudes of these authorities appear to be par-
 ticularly important for the types of protest (for example, incon-
 spicuous and conventional protest) overrepresented in the ques-
 tionnaire sample.
 56 Specification of the conditions under which the attitudes of various sectors
 of the community are of minimal and maximal importance in affecting re-
 sponsiveness is an interesting theoretical problem having important prescriptive
 implications. This subject is considered in the larger study from which this
 paper is derived. See Paul Schumaker, "The Power of Protest Groups: Sys-
 tem Responsiveness to Citizen Demands" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
 University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1973), 220-263.
 57 Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 4.
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 A final sector of the community whose attitudes may affect policy
 responsiveness is the media. In addition to transmitting informa-
 tion about protest groups and their demands, the media may also,
 through biased coverage and editorial positions, play an advocating
 role.58 One would expect that media support would enhance policy
 responsiveness to protest-group demands, but the data in Table 3
 are somewhat inconclusive in this respect. If one looks at the
 partial correlation and regression coefficients concerned with the
 independent effect of media support on policy responsiveness, the
 relationship appears to be negative-significantly so in the case
 studies sample. This finding is an anomaly which may or may not
 be explained by the notion that local newspapers often support
 unpo.pular causes. However, the zero-order correlation coefficients
 show positive relationships, indicating a more intuitively satisfying
 conclusion that responsiveness is enhanced by media support.
 The explanation for the divergence between the positive zero-
 order relationship and the negative partial relationship in this case
 is that media support influences policy responsiveness indirectly
 by affecting the attitudes of other sectors of the community.59 Pro-
 test groups might profitably seek media support because it may win
 support from other segments of the community and thus result in
 enhanced policy responsiveness.
 In summary, the second hypothesis is correct in assuming that
 the attitudes of active groups are particularly important determ-
 inants of policy responsiveness to protest-group demands. Never-
 theless, the emphasis which Lipsky gives to active groups appears
 to be overstated. By viewing agency officials, elected officials, the
 media, and the community as a whole as additional sectors whose
 support or opposition influence policy responsiveness to protest-
 group demands, a richer more accurate picture of the environment
 of social support is attained. It appears that protest groups can
 profitably court favor here as well.
 Hypothesis 3. The final hypothesis is that policy responsiveness
 58 It is the media's role in transmitting information, rather than their role
 as advocates, which Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, 169-172, apparently be-
 lieves is critical to protest-group success.
 59 For a discussion of direct and indirect relationships among variables and
 appropriate techniques to discern these relationships, see the discussions by
 Sewell Wright, Otis Dudley Duncan, and Hubert Blalock, Jr., in Causal Models
 in the Social Sciences, ed. Hubert Blalock, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing
 Co., 1971), 101-151.
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 is reduced when protest groups adopt militant behaviors. It can be
 tested by examining the impact of various protest-group demands,
 actions, and leadership characteristics on policy responsiveness.
 Regarding demands, our hypothesis suggests that policy respon-
 siveness should be enhanced as demands become nonzero-sum,
 welfare, and/or status quo in orientation. The data in Table 3
 partially support this proposition. First, the zero-sum dimension
 of demands is negatively related to policy responsiveness. As ex-
 pected, policy responsiveness is reduced as protest-group demands
 become increasingly burdensome for other people in the com-
 munity. Secondly, the status-welfare dimension of demands is
 positively related to policy responsiveness. Again, the hypothesis
 correctly suggests that policy responsiveness is increased as demands
 become nonmilitant-as they express concern for material benefits
 rather than for "rights." Nevertheless, the status-welfare dimension
 is less strongly related to responsiveness in the questionnaire sample
 than in the case studies sample. It is possible to speculate that this
 difference may be due to the time periods covered in the two
 samples. Cultural changes in the past decade have made status
 demands less difficult to respond to than previously.60 It may also
 be possible that city officials are no longer as willing to satisfy
 groups whose primary demands simply require the allocation of
 material resources. In any event, the data suggest that there has
 been, and may still be, a systematic bias against status demands.
 The status quo/change dimension of demands, however, is not
 related to policy responsiveness as our hypothesis would suggest.
 Insignificantly weak zero-order relationships in the hypothesized
 direction change valence (and in the case studies sample become
 significant) when other protester-controlled variables are controlled.
 Perhaps it is not change per se which is resisted by local officials;
 rather it is the other behaviors and characteristics of protest groups
 making demands for change which cause resistance.61
 60 Those who are making status demands may have changed in the past
 decade. In the sixties, status demands were primarily raised by blacks; in the
 seventies, status demands are frequently made by various white protest groups
 who feel that their rights are being deprived.
 61 Indeed, because protest groups often protest against agency-induced
 changes, protest targets frequently resist protest groups who seek to maintain
 the status quo. For a discussion of these notions, see J. Clarence Davies iII,
 Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University
 Press, 1966).
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 Regarding leadership, our hypothesis suggests that policy re-
 sponsiveness should be enhanced when group leadership is indig-
 enous to the local community and when leadership projects non-
 militant styles. Again, the hypothesis is partially validated by the
 data in Table 3. On the one hand, the hypothesized negative re-
 lationship between using external leaders and policy responsiveness
 is not validated. In the case studies, where variation in this leader-
 ship variable could be observed, there was no relationship between
 use of internal or external leadership and the policy responsiveness
 of community officials. It may be that external leaders possess
 certain skills and resources (for example, organizational abilities,
 rhetorical gifts, charisma, and the like) which make them useful
 under certain conditions and which balance whatever liabilities
 they bring to the protest movement. The liabilities may include
 the belief by the authorities that demands articulated by outsiders
 do not reflect indigenous grievances or sentiment. On the other
 hand, the hypothesized negative relationship between having lead-
 ership which projects a militant style and attaining responsive
 policies is apparently supported by the data. In the questionnaire
 sample, the perception of militant leadership styles was negatively
 related to policy responsiveness.
 Regarding protest-group actions, our hypothesis suggests that
 policy responsiveness should be reduced as protest groups use in-
 creasingly militant actions. This hypothesis receives very weak
 support from the data presented in Table 3. Although the zero-
 order relationship between unconventionality of actions and policy
 responsiveness is significant and in the hypothesized direction in
 the questionnaire sample (r= -.26), the relationship is weakened
 and becomes insignificant when controls are applied for the other
 protester-controlled variables.62 Also in the case studies sample,
 the weak negative relationship is insignificant, a finding which sug-
 gests that if a relationship between the unconventionality of ac-
 tions and policy responsiveness exists, it is not well captured by the
 simple linear, additive, and recursive model examined in this
 62 This negative relationship between unconventionality of actions and policy
 responsiveness is partially spurious owing to the demand variables. Groups
 making militant demands tend to adopt unconventional actions and attain rela-
 tively few policy successes. Groups making nonmilitant demands tend to use
 conventional actions and attain relatively frequent policy successes.
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 paper.63 For present purposes, then, it is concluded that militant
 protest actions have little direct and noninteractive effect on the
 responsiveness of local officials to protest-group demands.
 In summary, the hypothesis that policy responsiveness is en-
 hanced by moderate protest behaviors receives some support from
 the data. Some protest characteristics which can be described as
 nonmilitant do seem to enhance responsiveness. No protest charac-
 teristics which can be described as militant seem to enhance re-
 sponsiveness. However, because the relationships are weak, broad
 generalizations about the effectiveness of nonmilitant behaviors
 must be tentative. It makes sense to suppose that these relation-
 ships are weak because nonmilitant behaviors are effective under
 some conditions while militant behaviors are effective under other
 conditions. Specification of these conditions thus becomes a key
 task of future research.
 In order to understand further the impact of moderate and mili-
 tant behaviors on responsiveness, it is instructive to examine the
 impact of protest demands, leadership, and actions of social support.
 Our model suggests a developmental sequence in which protester-
 controlled variables affect social support which, in turn, affects
 responsiveness. If militant protest-group behaviors diminish re-
 sponsiveness, it may be because such behaviors diminish the sup-
 port of those sectors of the community whose attitudes are im-
 portant determinants of policy responsiveness. The effects of zero-
 sum demands, external leadership, radical leadership, and uncon-
 ventional actions on the support of agency officials, elected officials,
 the media, active groups, and the community as a whole are in-
 dicated in Table 4.
 The data generally support the notion that militant behaviors de-
 crease social support. As protest groups make demands that are
 increasingly burdensome to others in the community, the support
 of the various sectors of the community appears to diminish sig-
 nificantly. The relationships between having external leaders and
 attaining support are negative in all cases, although significantly
 negative only for elected officials and the community as a whole.
 63 For a discussion of curvilinear, interactive, and nonrecursive models of
 this relationship, see Schumaker, "Protest Actions and Policy Responsiveness:
 Some Alternative Models" (paper presented at the 70th annual meeting of the
 American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., August 29-September 2,
 1974).
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 The relationships between having leaders who are labeled as radical
 and attaining support are also negative in all cases, although
 significantly so only for active groups and the community as a
 whole. Finally, the use of unconventional action also appears to be
 generally related to increased hostility toward the protest groups
 and their demands by various sectors of the community. In sum-
 mary, the data in Table 4 generally confirm the notions that non-
 militant behaviors increase social support which, in turn, increases
 the policy responsiveness of local systems, and that militant be-
 haviors decrease social support which, in turn, decreases policy
 responsiveness.
 It might still be argued, however, that militant actions can be
 functional for protest groups because they may serve to coerce or
 force political authorities to adopt responsive policies. Because
 coercion seeks to change behavior directly rather than indirectly
 through a change in attitudes, its impact should be measured by
 the direct effects which militant behaviors have on responsiveness.
 To determine this direct effect, the last column of Table 4 re-
 examines the impact which protest demands, leadership, and actions
 have on policy responsiveness when social support and other pro-
 test-group characteristics are controlled. As can be seen by com-
 paring the zero-order (ro) and partial (rp) correlations, the negative
 effects of militancy on responsiveness are reduced by controlling
 for social support. However, the positive effects of militancy re-
 main obscure. Militancy, then, has little direct coercive effect in
 enhancing policy responsiveness in American communities.
 In summary, because militant behaviors generally have little
 direct coercive effect and have the indirect effect of decreasing
 social support, protest-group militancy appears to be inversely
 related to policy responsiveness.
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 This paper has attempted to develop a partial explanation of the
 varying policy responses of local political systems to the demands
 of groups of citizens who coalesce on an informal issue-specific
 basis. In order to have prescriptive value, the paper has focused on
 determinants of responsiveness that can be directly or indirectly
 manipulated by protest groups themselves. The conclusion that
 attaining favorable policy responses is enhanced by adopting non-
 militant behaviors is suggestive in this respect.
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 However, this analysis may not warrant the conclusion that
 social scientists who wish to aid protest groups should prescribe
 nonmilitant behaviors. First, only the impact on policy responsive-
 ness of adopting moderate and militant behaviors has been ex-
 amined. Nothing has been said about what types of behaviors
 result in impact responsiveness. Nor has anything been said about
 what types of behaviors are most useful for building those power
 resources which can be used in future dealings with political sys-
 tems.64 Secondly, the relationships between the use of moderate
 behaviors and attaining responsive policies are weak. Certainly
 some types of militant behaviors can be effective under certain
 unspecified conditions. Thirdly, the conclusions in this paper must
 be deemed tentative pending the use of more rigorous sampling
 and measurement techniques.
 Despite these limitations, the analysis has suggested a number
 of important conclusions. First, the policy response of community
 officials to protest-group demands is affected by both social support
 variables and protester-controlled variables. Although the environ-
 ment of social support is more highly related to policy responsive-
 ness than are protester-controlled variables, the conclusion that pro-
 test groups are therefore unable to influence policy responsiveness
 is avoided. Partly because protester-controlled variables have an
 independent effect on responsiveness and partly because protester-
 controlled variables can affect the environment of social support, it
 has been argued that protest groups can enhance responsiveness by
 adopting appropriate behaviors. Secondly, the environment of
 social support which affects the policy response of local political
 systems to protest-group demands includes many more sectors of
 the community than simply its active groups. In particular, the
 attitudes of the targets of local protest-agency officials and elected
 officials-are more important determinants of policy responsiveness
 than is suggested by prevailing theories about protest groups. The
 implication is that protest groups can profitably appeal directly to
 64 In this regard, militancy may serve important expressive functions that are
 reinforcing to protest-group constituents and therefore keep them active in
 political organizations even if the policy outcome itself is not reinforcing.
 These ideas are suggested in the work of Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange
 Theory of Interest Groups," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (February
 1969), 1-32; and Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (rev. ed.;
 New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1971).
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 protest targets as well as to "third parties." Finally, the analysis
 has indicated that nonmilitancy may in general enhance both social
 support and policy responsiveness. Thus the effectiveness of mili-
 tancy may be overestimated by some scholars and activists.
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